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A Pure Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial Theory of Deposit Insurance Adoption
Abstract
Based on Becker, Kane, Niskanen, and Peltzman’s ideas, we develop a model to explain why
deposit insurance is adopted even though policymakers are aware of its pitfalls in both theory and
practice.  In our model, the regulator acts as both a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur to maximize his
self-interest through administering a deposit insurance scheme.  The theory postulates that adoption
of deposit insurance is more likely under the following conditions: the scheme is (i) publicly
administered and (ii) privately funded, with (iii) non-risk rated insurance premium and (iv)
compulsory membership; and there is (v) a larger deposit market with (vi) at least two groups of
banks (good vs. bad), (vii) lower government ownership of banks, and (viii) higher economic
freedom, such that one group exerts its political influence and gains from deposit insurance. 
Empirically our theory is supported by the stylized facts, cross-country binary-choice regression
results and a case study of Canada.
JEL Classifications: G21, G28, K23, L51
Keywords: Bureaucracy, Canada, Deposit Insurance, Economic Regulation, Political Economy,
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A Pure Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial Theory of Deposit Insurance Adoption
1. Introduction
Despite the notorious moral hazard problem and recurrence of banking crises associated with
explicit deposit insurance schemes (hereafter EDIS), there has been a global trend of instituting EDIS
since the 1980s (World Bank 2001).  Interestingly, this trend remains largely unexplained and
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) attribute it to “fads.”  Later, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008)
empirically found that external political pressure from the IMF, World Bank, and European Union, 
emulation of other countries, experience with financial crisis, democratic political process, GDP per
capita and inflation are significant determinants of EDIS adoption.
It is well known that the first nation-wide deposit insurance scheme was set up by the US
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1934; so if EDIS were effective in maintaining
banking stability, other countries would have followed suit shortly.  But in fact the US savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s (e.g. Kane 1989, Barth 1991) and similar mishaps in other countries, like
Canada (Carr et al. 1994, 1995) have revealed the huge costs and inefficiency of EDIS.  Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002) empirically show that EDIS work only among countries with strong
institutional settings such as strong regulation, rules of law, etc.   Among the ample evidence1
indicating that EDIS are no panacea for banking stability, Chu (2003) shows that EDIS have a short-
run stabilizing effect but a long-run destabilizing effect, and later (Chu 2011) also finds that the
higher the deposit insurance coverage, the more severe the banking crisis.  Therefore, the 
destabilizing effect and costs should have discouraged countries from adopting EDIS.
 See also Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) for details.1
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So why did policymakers still jump on the bandwagon in adopting EDIS?  Some countries2
had implicit deposit insurance such that depositors did not suffer any loss in bank failures; then why
did they later set up EDIS? Were regulators poorly informed about the performance of EDIS? Were
they simply irrational? Or were there other possible reasons?
As will be seen in Section 2, the public-interest theories do not explain EDIS adoption
satisfactorily or they are inconsistent with the facts in one way or another.  Consequently some
scholars have rejected the public-interest arguments and postulated that EDIS are the outcome of
private interest instead.3
Based on a private-interest argument, this paper offers a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial  theory
of EDIS adoption.  In a nutshell, it postulates that regulators, like ordinary economic agents,
maximize their own self-interest and have incentives to introduce EDIS if they can derive benefits,
say, higher salaries, more fringe benefits, higher office expenses, etc, (e.g. Niskanen 1971) that
outweigh the costs of more input efforts in administering EDIS and in regulating banks, etc.  On the
one hand, regulators are bureaucrats.  But on the other hand, they are also entrepreneurs who have
incentives to seek their benefits or profit opportunities by building their own enterprises – EDIS in
this case.  From an alternative perspective, regulators with their regulatory power and as rent seekers
put forward EDIS as rent extraction so as to threaten and force banks to cede and share part of their
interests with the regulators.
 Engineer et al. (2013) offer an alternative explanation based on a non-cooperative policy game model: nations2
compete for deposits in order to protect their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight. 
Their explanation and ours are not mutually exclusive, however.
 The notion that regulators do not necessarily serve the public interest but rather the interests of the political3
regulators and pressure groups has a long history.  See, for example, the pioneer works of Stigler (1971), Peltzman
(1976), and Becker (1983), to name just a few.  The later studies (e.g. Kane 1990) can be regarded as extensions and
applications of these pioneer works to banking regulation.
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Our theory postulates that EDIS adoption is more likely under the following conditions: the
scheme is (i) publicly administered and (ii) privately funded, with (iii) non-risk rated insurance
premium and (iv) compulsory membership; and there is (v) a larger deposit market with (vi) at least
two groups of banks (good vs. bad), (vii) lower government ownership of banks, and (viii) higher
economic freedom.
Empirically we test our theory based on cross-country data for the year 2013 released by the
World Bank and other data sources.  Adoption of an EDIS is modeled as a binary-choice dependent
variable with explanatory variables (or proxies) derived or inferred from our theory and other control
variables as determinants.  As in previous empirical studies, our regression results indicate that
banking crises and political factors are significant determinants of EDIS adoption. Consistent with
the predictions of our theory, the results suggest that, all other things equal, EDIS adoption is more
likely with a higher ratio of deposits to GDP (or deposits-GDP ratio hereafter), a lower five-firm
concentration ratio in the banking industry and a lower government ownership of banks.
Recognizing the limitations of the regression analysis, we also carry out statistical analysis
to compare economies with and without EDIS, and examine Canada’s introduction of Canadian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in 1967 as a case study.  In sum, results of the statistical and
regression analyses and of the case study lend support to our theory.
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section elaborates on the inadequacy of public-
interest theories in explaining the trend of EDIS adoption and thus motivates our theory. Section 3
offers a brief literature review, followed by the theoretical model and its empirical implications.  The
data, empirical methods and findings are discussed in Section 5.  We examine the Canadian
experience as a case study in the penultimate section before the paper concludes.
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2. Inadequacy of Public-Interest Theories in Explaining EDIS Adoption 
Besides the huge costs and ineffectiveness of EDIS, it is also puzzling when we try to
reconcile the trend of EDIS with the theories justifying deposit insurance or theories of economic
agents’ behavior towards risk.  More specifically, almost all industrial countries have instituted
EDIS.  By contrast, EDIS are less common in emerging markets and less developed countries
(LDCs), even though there is a growing trend of adoption among the former.  Why is there such a
systematic pattern?
There may be several possible explanations for this phenomenon.  First, one may argue that
only industrial countries can afford EDIS because they are costly to set up.  But this explanation is
unsatisfactory.  Even though the costs of EDIS are high in the long run because of bank failures
associated with moral hazard problems (e.g. Barth 1989, Barth et al. 1991), the initial setup costs
require relatively low outlays from the stakeholders.
Furthermore, financial regulation is generally more complex and extensive in industrial
countries than in LDCs.  If banking regulation was effective in maintaining banking stability, then
why did industrial countries further institute costly EDIS?  At the margin, the benefits from
introducing EDIS may not outweigh the costs in the long run.
Superficially, the rise of EDIS in developed countries may be resulted from wealthy people’s
demand because the rich is more inclined than the poor to take risk and to insure themselves
simultaneously.  However, wealthy investors typically hold diversified risky portfolios more than
safe assets like deposits.  Moreover, financial markets in developed countries are more efficient and 
more innovative than in LDCs such that wealthy investors are able, to some extent, to self-insure by
holding well-diversified portfolios with low transaction costs.  Furthermore, if regulators follow a
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too-big-to-fail policy, then wealthy investors who hold mega-bank shares can even enjoy the
subsidies from implicit deposit insurance of such a policy, not to mention that they can politically
influence the payouts.   To them, the benefit of EDIS is marginal, if not redundant, as their portfolios4
are largely uncovered by EDIS.  As financial safety nets, therefore, EDIS should be relatively more
popular in countries where financial markets are less well-developed.  However, this argument is
simply counterfactual and inconsistent with one of the “stylized facts” of EDIS.5
One may then argue that an objective of EDIS is to protect small depositors rather than
wealthy investors.  If so, with less developed welfare systems, or even in their absence, LDCs should
have higher incentives to adopt EDIS than developed countries because the adverse impact of deposit
losses on small depositors is, at the margin, higher than on large depositors.  This public-interest
argument is again counterfactual.
To support the public-interest argument, one may further argue that most developed countries
are democratic and, as outcomes of democratic political processes, their governments are elected to
protect the majority of their citizens by introducing EDIS.  As far as we know, however, none of the
existing EDIS was introduced as a result of referendum or as an important issue in a political plank
and platform during an election campaign.  In almost all cases, governments simply introduced EDIS
in a top-down manner, at most with some consultations.  One striking feature in the European EDIS
was that “the public is totally ignorant of their existence.  Publicity is even forbidden in the Federal
 I am indebted to Professor Kane for pointing out this possible scenario to me.   4
 The  “stylized facts” of EDIS are the following typical observations (though there are few exceptions in each5
case): (i) EDIS are mostly found in developed and high-income countries, whereas most LDCs do not have EDIS; (ii)
EDIS membership is typically compulsory; (iii) foreign currency deposits are usually uncovered; (iv) EDIS are
commonly funded from private banks’ resources; (v) EDIS are typically managed by government agencies; (vi) premiums
are typically based on amount of insured bank deposits rather than bank risk; and (vii) co-insurance provisions are rare. 
This list may not be exhaustive.  For more details, see Dermirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008, 2014, and 2015).
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Republic of Germany” (Baltensperger and Dermine 1990, p.28).  Following the EU Directive on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes of 1994, EDIS adoption is an obligation of EU membership rather than
a choice (Huizinga 2008).  Apparently, democracy has not been a decisive driving force.  Ironically,
a benevolent altruistic dictator, say, in a LDC, would have set up an EDIS to protect poor small
depositors if his objective was really to promote public interest.
This is not to say that democracy plays no role at all in the process of EDIS adoption.  A
democracy tends to allow different interest groups to influence government’s decisions than does
a non-democracy (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008).  But it is almost practically impossible that these
special interests coincide exactly with the public interest, not to mention that regulators have their
own career interests (Kane 1990).
Arguably, a main public-interest argument for EDIS is its efficacy in preventing bank runs. 
But bank runs are not necessarily contagious and they can in effect maintain strong market discipline
(e.g. Kaufman 1994, 1996).  On the other hand, the public-interest argument based on protection of
small depositors cannot adequately justify the need of EDIS because there are less costly alternatives
to achieve this goal, such as short-term treasury securities (Benston and Kaufman 1988), checkable
money market mutual funds (Cowen and Kroszner 1990), and government saving bonds (Chu 2000),
to mention just a few.
3. A Brief Literature Review
3.1 Public-interest versus Private-interest Theories
It is not quite possible to give a review of the extensive literatures on banking regulation,
deposit insurance and economics of regulation.  To make the task manageable, we focus on the major
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studies more relevant to this study so as to facilitate the reader to have a better understanding of the
issues involved.  We begin with the political economy theories of regulation in general and then
review how they have been applied to banking regulation and to EDIS adoption in particular.
Historically, theories of economic regulation have mainly focused on regulation of industries
like public utilities (e.g. Kahn 1989[1970/71]) rather than banking until recently.  Traditionally,
regulation has been justified based on the public-interest theory, i.e., regulation is a public policy that
addresses the private sector’s behaviors so as to promote the general public’s welfare (e.g. Mitnick
1980).  One major shortcoming of the public-interest theory is its inconsistency with empirical
evidence or stylized facts.  The theory asserts that government regulation arises in response to the
public’s demand for correcting inequitable practices or market failures due to natural monopoly,
externalities, asymmetric information, etc.  But Viscount et al. (2005, pp. 375-80) criticize it being
a hypothesis or statement about empirical regularities rather than a theory.  Both theoretical and
empirical studies have demonstrated that regulation is not positively correlated with existence of
externalities or monopoly (Posner 1974).  Instead, the empirical evidence tends to support that
regulation is in favour of producers rather than consumers.
This empirical evidence saw the development of one of the most well-known theories against
the public-interest theory, namely the capture theory according to which, instead of promoting public
interest, the regulator is captured by the regulated industry to supply regulation so as to promote the
latter’s interest, or the regulator is captured by the regulated industry over time (e.g. the life cycle
model of Chatov 1978).  Although the capture theory has more empirical support and is more
consistent with the regulatory history than the public-interest theory, it is criticized for its lack of a
theoretical foundation and its contradiction to certain empirical evidence (e.g. Posner 1975, Viscount
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et al. 2005, among others).  Nevertheless, it has highlighted the main notion that regulation is based
on private rather than public interest.
Since the early 1970s, several private-interest theories of regulation have been put forward. 
A path-breaking approach is the economic theory of regulation by Stigler (1971) who criticizes the
public-interest theory on several grounds.  First, the concept of public interest is vague because an
economic policy can be beneficial to one interest group but harmful to another.  Second, it is difficult
to find empirical evidence to support the public-interest theory.  Third, there can be divergence
between the regulator’s objective and that of the regulated.  Based on the simple notion of demand
and supply, Stigler argues that demand for regulation arises from certain interest groups in an
industry whereas the supply comes from regulators or politicians; regulation is a means through
which wealth is transferred from one interest group to another.  His theory admits the possibility of
capture of the regulator by interest groups, but it replaces the capture metaphor by the neutral
terminology of demand and supply.
Peltzman (1976) extends Stigler’s model by putting forward a political support function to
explain which industries are more likely to be regulated.  The regulator chooses the form of
regulation, such as  price regulation, to maximize the political support from the majority.  Similar
to Stigler’s theory, the regulator transfers wealth from one interest group to another in the process
of seeking political support.  Along a similar line of argument, Becker (1983) develops a model in
which two interest groups compete with each other in influencing the regulator in order to maximize
their own welfare.  Other theories built upon Stigler’s theory of economic regulation include the
Posner’s (1975) cartel model of regulation and Hettich and Winer’s (1988) tax structure model, to
name just a few.
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Another strand of literature on private-interest theories of regulation is based on the seminal
idea of rent seeking pioneered by Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974).  Rent seeking is a non-
productive activity that protects the vested interest groups or redistributes wealth from one interest
group to another.  In the arena of regulation, McChesney (1987) proposes the concepts of political
rent creation and rent extraction.  In political rent creation, government officials or politicians can
use their political or regulatory power to intervene and to increase the profits of certain private
businesses; in return, the private businesses will share the increased profits with them.  In rent
extraction, regulators or politicians deliberately propose a certain policy that can harm some private
businesses so as to threaten the latter to cede and share part of their interests with the politicians.
3.2 Applications to Banking
Needless to say, politics and banking interact and how the political game played by
politicians, bankers, and various interest groups explains why banking varies dramatically across
countries (Calomiris and Haber 2014).  The notion of public interest has been extended to banking
or financial regulation, including deposit insurance.  In a highly influential paper, Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) develop a theoretical model in which a bank run can be characterized as a “bad”
equilibrium that leads to deterioration in depositors’ welfare, thus justifying EDIS adoption to
promote banking stability.  On the other hand, Friedman and Schwartz (1986) provide economic
arguments to justify the role of government in money and banking; one argument is that bank runs
or banking panics have negative externalities on the economy.  In brief, there are economic reasons
to justify EDIS based on public interest.
In contrast, the private-interest views of regulation of industries have been extended to
banking regulation in the last two decades.  To understand the emergence of financial regulation, as
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correctly pointed out by Roe (1990), it is crucial to understand the behaviors of the government and
politicians from a political economy perspective.  In fact, politicians do not necessarily act only as
representatives for the public interest because they themselves have their own interests.  This view
has been echoed by Boot and Thakor (1993) and Kane (1990), among others. More formally,
Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) provide evidence of competition among interest groups to increase
their franchise value in the US financial services industry, followed by Kroszner and Strahan (1999,
2001) who argue that US banking policies are primarily shaped by the private interests of the
regulators and the regulated rather than by public interest.  More specifically, they note that smaller
US banks used their dominant position and political influence to delay branching deregulation and
that the timing of bank deregulation reflected not only industry development but also the different
interest groups’ relative power.  Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002)
argue that governments regulate banks to promote political constituencies.  All these are some
examples of the applications of the private-interest views in the analysis of financial and banking
regulation.6
There are studies specifically related to deposit insurance based on the private-interest theory. 
In a historical study, Calomiris and White (1994) argue that smaller and poorly diversified unit banks
in the US benefitted from the FDIC and that their pleas for deposit insurance could not have
overcome the larger banks’ political opposition had it not been the erosion of the public’s confidence
in the banking system due to the Great Depression.  Based on a model of monopolistic competition
between small and large banks as well as empirical and historical evidence, Economides et al. (1996,
 For details, see Barth et al. (2006), who offer an excellent brief survey of the different approaches to banking6
regulation.
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1999) show that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the
US was motivated by political considerations for the benefit of the small unit banks that were unable
to compete effectively with large, multi-unit banks.  Similarly, Kane (1997) points out further that
deposit insurance protects small banks and depositors at the expense of taxpayers.  Kroszner and
Strahan (2001), and Laeven (2004) point out that deposit insurance is favoured by riskier banks. 
Deposit insurance will be favoured by large banks as well so long as it is under-priced  (e.g., Kane
and Wilson 1998, Laeven 2002, among others).  Laeven (2004) provides evidence in support of the
private-interest view as deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly
capitalized banks dominate the industry.  Carr et al. (1994, 1995) demonstrate that CDIC was set up
in 1967 based on a political motive – to enable the weaker trust and mortgage loan companies
(TMLs) to compete with the large and stable chartered banks – rather than banking instability.  After
reviewing the two main theoretical approaches -- economic approach (grounded on economic gains
and motivated by public interest) and the political approach (grounded on power of political interest
groups and motivated by private interest) – and the empirical evidence, Calomiris and Jaremski
(2016) conclude that the latter approach is more consistent with the facts.
3.3 Theories of Bureaucracy and Lessons from the Literature
Besides the private-interest theory, our theory is related to another strand of literature, namely
the bureaucratic behavior of government officials, including regulators and central bankers.  Our
notion that bureaucrats are basically in the business to make a living so as to maximize their own
personal interests can be traced back to as early as Tullock and McKenzie (1985), Acheson and
Chant (1972, 1973) and Niskanen (1971), to name just a few.  In Niskanen’s celebrated model, for
example, government bureaucrats gain from the growth of bureaucracy because an official’s power,
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opportunities for promotion and other perquisites are positively correlated with the budget the
bureaucrat administers, whereas Acheson and Chant (1972, 1973) are among the first to apply the
bureaucratic theory to study central bank’s behavior – though not a deposit insurance provider – in
the choice of monetary instruments and goals.
Several lessons can perhaps be learned from the above brief literature survey.  First, the
capture theory does not explain satisfactorily why regulators have to be captured; in fact, they do not
necessarily have to be captured by any stakeholders of the regulation.  Second, regulation is costly. 
So even if the regulator cares about the public interest or his own self-interest, he has to compare the
costs and benefits of regulation.  Third, there is no reason to believe that the regulator would care
about the transfer of wealth from one interest group to another unless the regulator himself also gains
from this wealth redistribution process.  Last but not least, the moral hazard problem associated with
deposit insurance can lead to such high social costs of bank failures in the long run that they
outweigh the social benefits.  In sum, a satisfactory explanation for EDIS adoption may have to go
beyond the public-interest and capture theories.
4. A Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial Theory
To explain EDIS adoption, we formulate a simple theory in which the regulator (deposit
insurance provider) plays a dual role as both a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur to maximize his own
self-interest.  For simplicity, the regulator’s utility is assumed to be a function of his effort (î) put
into the regulatory process and the gross profits (ð) generated from administering the deposit
insurance fund.  Apparently the higher his effort, the lower is his utility.  Contrarily, the higher the
gross profits, the higher is his utility because he can enjoy a higher salary, fringe benefits, office
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expense, etc (e.g., Niskanen 1971).  The utility function has the standard assumptions like continuity,
twice differentiability: U = U(î, ð).  As an illustrative example, Figure 1 depicts the regulator’s three
0 1 2 2 0 1indifference curves U , U  and U , where the levels of utility are U  > U  > U .
For the second argument ð in the utility function, the regulator acts as an entrepreneur who
has a profit motive to derive his salary, fringe benefits, etc., from his job as a manager for
administering the deposit insurance fund.  Without the fund, his salary and fringe benefits rely on
the financial resources allocated by the government to banking regulation.  In contrast, the regulator
enjoys a higher degree of autonomy in deciding his own remunerations or office expenses with a
fund.  Similar to Kane (1989), the deposit insurance fund’s gross profits (ð) is specified as7
(1)
where ñ is the insurance premium, D is the deposits insured, r is the average rate of return on
minvestment assets held by the fund, I is the amount of investment by the fund,  C  is the cost of
8
Lmonitoring insured banks, and C  is the losses incurred in resolving bank insolvencies.  For
analytical tractability, D is assumed to be exogenously given.
Monitoring cost is directly under the regulator’s control and is an increasing function of his
m meffort, and it follows the standard assumptions for a typical cost functions, i.e., C  = C (î), and
m m LMC /Mî > 0 and M C /Mî  > 0.  The cost function C  is not directly under the regulator’s control but
2 2
is related to the monitoring effort or cost.  Furthermore, the cost is related to the deposits insured. 
 Kane’s model can be conceived as a multi-period model in which the market value of the insurance enterprise7
– the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation – is the present value of a perpetuity of future cash flows
discounted by the insurer’s cost of capital.  Without loss of generality, we focus here on the cash flows or gross profit
only.
 Our results will remain intact even if r and I in Equation (1) are omitted by assuming that the EDIS has no8
investment assets when it is initially launched.
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L mIt is assumed that C  = k D, where k = k(C ), k’ < 0 and k” > 0, i.e., the regulator’s higher level of
monitoring can reduce the losses due to bank failures but there are diminishing returns to his
monitoring efforts.
It is straightforward to show that the signs of Mð/Mî and M ð/Mî  depend on the relative2 2
mmagnitudes of changes of C  and k with respect to a change in  î.   But like typical cost functions,
9
m Lit is reasonable to assume that C  is low but C  is high for î = 0 or for low levels of î because more
banks may fail as a result of lax monitoring and moral hazard.  Consequently, ð # 0. With increasing
monitoring effort, the (expected) losses from bank failures can be reduced such that Mð/Mî > 0. But
increasing monitoring cost on the one hand and diminishing returns to efforts on the other implies
Mð/Mî = 0 at some î and Mð/Mî < 0 beyond this level.   In other words, the profit function is concave10
downward in the ð-î plane but its position depends on the values of the given parameters and
exogenous variables, i.e., ñ, D, I and r.
Therefore, a regulator can potentially make profits from an EDIS; but whether he will
actually do so still depends on some other factors.  In a non-democratic society or centrally planned
economy, for example, the bureaucrat does not necessarily adopt an EDIS if the government has
already had a high ownership of banks, because instituting and administering a new EDIS means
duplication of resources or efforts without any extra benefits to him.  This should also be the case
in democratic societies.
In a democratic society, a further determinant is the acceptability or popularity of an EDIS
m m m m From Equation (1), it is straightforward to show that Mð/Mî = ! C’  ! k’C’  D  and M ð/Mî  = ! C”  ! k”C’
9 2 2 2
mD ! k’C”  D.  Both expressions can be positive or negative.
 At the margin, Mð/Mî= 0 when the monitoring cost is equal to the cost of resolving insolvency.10
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among the various stakeholders involved.  One conventional theory of regulation postulates that
politicians in a democratic society would introduce an EDIS to “buy” votes from depositors.  But
as already mentioned, casual empiricism does not support this hypothesis because none of the EDIS
was introduced with a referendum or had been an issue in an election campaign.
Instead, it is more likely that banks rather than depositors are the major players in the political
game.  Without loss of generality, we assume that the banking industry consists of two groups –
“good” and “bad” banks.  Or one can think of two groups of depository institutions, like chartered
banks and TMLs in the case of Canada.  Because of cross-subsidization under an EDIS with a non-
risk rated premium, bad banks gain while good banks lose.  Based on the ideas of Peltzman (1976)
and Becker (1983), we postulate that in a democratic society the political support function (P) or
influence function is a function of the two interest groups’ spending on lobbying:11
(2)
1 2 1 2where N  and N  are the numbers of good and bad banks, and L  and L  are respectively each group’s
average expenditure on lobbying against and for an EDIS.  If bad banks spend more on lobbying than
good banks, the regulator will introduce an EDIS to increase bad banks’ welfare; otherwise, the
status quo remains.  Assuming perfect information and no random shocks, the two interest groups
compete for control of government policy by their expenditure on lobbying.  Consider the initial
condition before the introduction of EDIS.  To simplify the algebra, assume each group consists of
i iN  identical banks so that a representative bank’s profit ð  in group i can be expressed as proportional
to its deposits or market share:
 The notion of competition among pressure groups and lobbying can be traced back to at least Olson (1965)11
and subsequent works include Grossman and Helpman (2001), among others.
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 (3)
i 1 2where k is the profit per unit of deposit and S  is the bank’s deposits, where S  > S , i.e. good banks
have larger market shares.
2Then each bad bank lobbies for EDIS by spending L  whereas each good bank responds by




1 1 2 2Conversely if L N  < L N , EDIS will be introduced and a good bank’s profit will become
 (5)
whereas a bad bank’s profit will be
 (6)
where ö is the new profit per unit of deposit (i.e., net of deposit insurance premium) and T is the
transfer of market share from a good bank to a bad bank.  Here the deposit insurance premium is
assumed to be non-risk rated or actuarially unfair such that there is a transfer or cross-subsidization
from good banks to bad banks in terms of redistribution of deposits or market shares.14
In this model of interest group competition, a representative bad bank makes a first move by
2 2 2 2choosing L , where 0 # L  # L̄ , to lobby for EDIS.  The maximum spending on lobbying, L̄ , is
 For simplicity and analytical tractability, our model is deterministic.  In the case of uncertainty or imperfect12
1 2information about the extent of lobbying, L  and L  can be replaced respectively by their expected values based on the
banks’ subjective beliefs.
 We assume zero cost in organizing the banks into a group in the lobbying process.  This is not crucial in13
affecting our results so long as both good and bad banks face the same non-zero per unit organizing cost.
 For the debate on the feasibility of fairly priced deposit insurance, see Chan et al. (1992) and Freixas and14
Rochet (1998). 
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determined by the difference between its profits determined by Equations (6) and (4).  In response,
1 1a good bank chooses 0 # L  # L̄ , to lobby against EDIS, where the maximum spending on lobbying,
1L̄ , is determined by the difference between its profits determined by Equations (4) and (5).  It is
1 2 2 1 1 1 2obvious that the good bank’s optimal response is to set L  = L N /N  and L  # L̄ , for whatever L
* *
1is chosen by the bad bank provided that L  is affordable and profitable.  However, the number of
*
2 1 2 2 1bad banks, N , can be so large that it is no longer profitable for good banks to set L  = L N /N  and,
1 1 2 1 1 2 2if so, the optimal L  =0.  By substituting L̄  and L̄  into the inequality L N  < L N , EDIS may be
*
introduced if the following condition is satisfied:
 (7)
which depends on the structural characteristics of the banking industry, like the numbers of good and
bad banks as well as their market shares.  Apparently this inequality is more likely to be satisfied
when, all other things equal, the number of bad banks or the value of transfer, or both, is larger.
Equation (7) is only a necessary condition as the EDIS adoption still depends on the
regulator’s final decision.  Formally the regulator’s problem is: choose î to maximize U = U(î, ð)
subject to the following constraints: (i) the profit function (1), (ii) political support for EDIS (i.e.,
0Equation (7) is satisfied), and (iii) the solution to the optimization problem U* = U(î*, ð*) > U  =
U(î = 0, ð = 0), i.e., an improvement in his welfare by introducing EDIS.
1 2Diagrammatically, Figure 1 shows the iso-profit lines labelled as Ð  and Ð   for two levels
1 2 2 1of insured deposits D  and D  respectively, where D  > D , all other things equal.  Given the iso-
profit lines and the regulator’s indifference curves, we can determine diagrammatically whether a
utility maximizing regulator will introduce EDIS or not.  Suppose the regulator’s initial equilibrium
-17-
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming (13) 2021
www.RofEA.org
is at the origin before the introduction of EDIS.   His initial utility is represented by the indifference15
0curve U .  Whether the introduction of EDIS will raise his utility or not depends on the new
equilibrium under EDIS, which is determined by the tangency between an indifference curve and an
iso-profit line under EDIS.
1 1To illustrate, consider the iso-profit line Ð  that represents a given level of deposits (D ).  The
1 1utility maximization equilibrium is at E  with a utility level U , which is lower than the initial level
0U .  In this case, it does not pay for the regulator to introduce EDIS even though there is political
support for it.  Because of the insufficient gross profits generated from administering a deposit
insurance fund, the regulator would find himself better off by enjoying leisure or pursuing other
activities that may advance his political career, say, socializing with politicians, instead of
administering the fund.
Obviously, the volume of insured deposits is one of the key factors that determine whether
the deposit insurance fund can generate a sufficiently high level of expected profits.  Suppose the
2 2volume of insured deposits is sufficiently high, say, D  as in the case of Ð , and all other things
equal.  Then in this case the regulator would be better off by introducing EDIS because the new
2 2 0equilibrium E  is on an indifference curve U  with a higher level of utility than U .
In sum, the regulator in our model plays a role in redistributing deposits (and hence wealth)
from good banks to bad banks through cross-subsidization under a flat-rate or mis-priced EDIS and
at the same time he gains from administering the EDIS.  For analytical tractability, one potential gain
of the regulator from the revolving door – i.e. the regulator’s later move into the lobbying industry
 For simplicity and convenience, the regulator’s initial effort in regulating banks in the absence of EDIS is15
normalized to equal to zero.  The horizontal axis in Figure 1 thus measures the regulator’s “extra” effort under an EDIS.
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– is not considered here and is left for future research.16
Based on the above exposition and applying Mackie’s (1965) INUS-conditions approach, 
we can infer or postulate the following empirically testable hypotheses, each of which is related to
a factor or an INUS-condition:17
(i).  For the regulator to play a dual role as a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur at the same time, our
theory predicts that when an EDIS is adopted the scheme is expected to be officially administered
or managed by the public sector, or at least jointly between the public and the private sector.
(ii). By the same token, the source of funding of the EDIS is expected to mainly come from the
private sector (say, banks) rather than from the government.
(iii). The larger the volume of deposits, the more likely is EDIS adoption.  This is because of larger
expected profits earned by regulators as well as larger transfers received by bad banks.  Moreover,
the larger the volume of deposits, the larger and more rapid for the deposit insurance fund to build
up, thus generating greater profits and hence higher utilities for the regulator.18
 For studies related to the revolving door, see, for example, the theoretical model by Che (1995) and the16
empirical study by Vidal et al.(2012), although these two studies are generic and do not address specifically the case of
deposit insurance.
 According to Mackie’s INUS-conditions for causality, each factor is an Insufficient but Non-redundant part17
of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition for the effect or an event.  A classic example is: a short circuit causes a house
fire.  The short circus is an inus-condition because it is insufficient to cause the fire on its own without the presence of
other conditions like oxygen, inflammable material, etc., and it is non-redundant because the other conditions cannot
cause a fire without it.  Taken together, they form a sufficient condition to cause a fire.  But it is not a necessary condition
because some other conditions can also cause a fire.  We will apply this approach to illustrate our case of deposit
insurance adoption below.
 This finding can be formally derived from our model.  From the regulator’s indirect utility function V and 18
the Envelope Theorem, we have dV/dD  = MU/Mð (ñ!k).  On the surface, dV/dD  can be positive or negative depending
on (ñ!k). But similar to a firm’s shutdown point at which it produces no output if price falls below minimum average
variable cost, the regulator can choose not to launch EDIS.  From Equation (1), this “shutdown point” is found by setting
m ð$0, I = 0 and î = 0 (thus C = 0), which means (ñ!k)D  $0 for any arbitrary D  $0, or simply (ñ!k) $0. The economic
interpretation is that the deposit insurance premium has to be set, ex ante, at a rate high enough to cover the (expected)
deposit loss per dollar deposit, or else it makes no economic sense to introduce EDIS.  Therefore, we have dV/dD  $0.
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(iv). EDIS adoption is more likely when there are at least two groups of banks with distinguishable
characteristics such that one group will relatively gain from EDIS.  As long as deposit insurance is
mis-priced, all incumbents, both big and small banks, gain. But smaller and riskier banks are likely
to benefit more from EDIS.  If the banking industry is dominated by a few large banks, they are more
likely to resist EDIS adoption because they are more likely to lose from the wealth transfers under
EDIS arising from increased competition from smaller banks or new entrants; big banks also have
the privilege of enjoying the subsidies from implicit deposit insurance under the regulator’s too-big-
to-fail policy. Therefore, a higher concentration ratio in the banking industry, which suggests
stronger dominance of larger banks, tends to lower the likelihood of EDIS adoption.  This prediction
based on concentration ratio can be formally inferred from the interest-group competition in our
model above as Equation (7) can also be expressed as
 (8)
The right-hand side of this inequality is good banks’ market share.  If the concentration ratio is high,
Equation (8) is less likely to be satisfied and hence a lower political support for EDIS.
(v). When an EDIS is initially introduced, the insurance premium is expected to be non-risk rated
or mis-priced rather than risk-rated in order to render cross subsidization and transfer of wealth from
good banks to bad banks.
(vi). For the transfer to be effective, membership of EDIS is expected to be compulsory, or else good
banks would opt out.
(vii). If all or most banks are government-owned, then these banks already have implicit government
guarantee of their deposits and hence it is less likely or necessary for EDIS adoption because there
is no need for the regulator to sell his products (i.e. transfers through regulation and deposit
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insurance) to banks.  Put differently, EDIS are more likely to be adopted by banking industries in
which most banks are privately owned.
(viii). Given (iv) above and the notion of interest-group competition, EDIS adoption is more likely
in economies with higher levels of democracy or economic freedom such that one group of banks
can influence the political process and gain from EDIS.
In Mackie’s sense, to say that the regulator’s bureaucratic-entrepreneurial behavior causes
EDIS adoption is to say that the former is an inus-condition for the latter.  The bureaucratic-
entrepreneurial behavior is an insufficient part because it cannot cause EDIS adoption on its own. 
The above conditions should also be present.  It is, however, a non-redundant part because, without
it, the other conditions are not sufficient for the adoption.  It is just a part, and not the whole, of a
theoretically sufficient condition (i.e., the behavior plus combinations of (i)-(viii) above).  However,
this whole sufficient condition is not necessary, because some other conditions can also lead to EDIS
adoption (e.g. the Great Depression and the setup of FDIC).19
5. Empirical Evidence
To test our theory, we examine the statistics on EDIS before we proceed with formal
econometric analysis.  Unless otherwise specified, the main databases employed are those compiled
by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014, 2015), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) on deposit insurance and those
 Such a systemic banking panic is sufficient for justifying EDIS adoption as a remedial measure because19
deposit insurance can have a short-run therapeutic effect in aborting the crisis (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 163-8).
This reason for EDIS adoption due to occurrence of banking crisis is, however, not incompatible with our theory.  Our
model is deterministic and banks are not subject to random shocks like banking crises.  Nevertheless, in the absence of
EDIS a banking crisis tends to adversely affect bad banks more than good banks for there could be a redistribution of
deposits from bad to good banks due to depositors’ flight to quality.  Accordingly, bad banks would have stronger
incentives to lobby EDIS adoption in order to retain their market shares.  See also what happened in the case study of
Canada below.
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by Barth et al. (2006, 2013) on banking regulation.
As a data exploration process, we first examine and compare the economies which have
already set up EDIS by 2013 with those without EDIS regarding certain socio-economic variables
relevant to our theory.  They include the deposits-GDP ratio, the five-firm concentration ratio of the
banking industry, government ownership of banks, experience of banking crisis, and the extent of
economic and political freedom.   All data are from the above databases except the deposits-GDP20
ratio and the level of political participation, which are respectively from the World Bank’s Global
Financial Development database and the Fraser Institute's Annual Report of Economic Freedom. 
Data for 2011 are compared and the summary statistics are tabulated as Table 1.
The deposits-GDP ratio is used as a measure of size of the banking system relative to size
of the economy.  As our theory predicts, economies with higher deposits-to-GDP ratios are more
likely to set up EDIS.   The five-firm concentration ratio of the banking industry is used as a proxy21
to reflect the extent of heterogeneity in bank size, i.e. to capture the notion of good banks versus bad
banks in our model and the empirical prediction (iv) mentioned above.  The lower the concentration
ratio, the banking industry is less likely to be dominated by the five largest banks; and hence it is
more likely for smaller banks to lobby the government to set up an EDIS for them to gain from cross
subsidization.  Government ownership of banks refers to the percentage of banking system’s assets
in banks that are 50% or more owned by government.  According to our theory, the higher the level
 We have also experimented with: (i) the Democracy Index and the index of political participation published20
by the Economist Intelligent Unit (2011); (ii) the political rights index and civil liberties index by the Freedom House
(2016) and (iii) a dummy variable representing an electoral regime. The results, however, remain qualitatively similar. 
For brevity, we report only the findings based on the Economic Freedom Index by the Fraser Institute (2012).
 The public-interest view also has this prediction but with reverse causality – deposit insurance makes bank21
deposits more attractive and hence a higher deposits to GDP ratio.
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of government bank ownership, it is less likely for politicians or bureaucrats to have the needs or
incentives to set up EDIS to maximize their own interests.    To partly reflect competition between22 23
interest groups, the Economic Freedom Index is used as a proxy variable and reported here.  In
general,  the index value is high for democracies and low for authoritarian regimes; and interest
groups are more likely to participate in the political process so as to lobby the government to set up
EDIS under a higher level of economic freedom or political participation.  Finally, we include the
experience of banking crisis as a control variable.  It is a dummy variable with a value of one if an
economy had at least a systemic banking crisis in previous years and a value of zero if it has never
had any systemic crisis.  Intuitively, economies which experienced banking crises are more likely
to set up EDIS to avert the recurrence of banking crises.  Admittedly, the cross-sectional
specification is subject to limitations and criticisms, particularly in capturing the actual timing of
EDIS adoption.  For example, EDIS adoption now may have little to do with a crisis occurred a long
time ago.  Or take the US as another example – the recent US data would have little to do with the
introduction of FDIC in 1934.   As such, the regression results below should perhaps be24
 An alternative explanation is: deposits at government-owned banks can be perceived as a form of government22
debt and if the government can print money to pay off this debt, then it is less likely or unnecessary for the government
to set up an EDIS when the government has a high ownership of banks. This hypothesis, however, seems to be less
widely applicable than ours because monetization of such government debt may be infeasible in certain countries, e.g.
the Eurozone.
 In theory, the relationship between government ownership of banks and EDIS adoption may not be so simple. 23
If the government-owned banks are so large that they have de facto implicit deposit insurance and make smaller banks
at a competitive disadvantage, smaller banks may hence favor EDIS in order to level the playing field.  In other words,
there is potentially an interaction effect between concentration ratio and government ownership of banks.  However, we
find this interaction effect to be statistically insignificant.
 One possible approach to taking care of this timing problem is to consider countries that have no EDIS in24
period t = 0 and then model and estimate the hazard function of adopting EDIS in subsequent periods.  I am indebted
to Professor Peltzman for this suggestion.  Unfortunately, the currently available data for the explanatory variables do
not make this approach operationally feasible.  As will be seen below, we provide further empirical results to address
this timing or causation problem in EDIS adoption.
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appropriately interpreted as the likelihood to find a country with EDIS given the set of attributes
observed at any given moment, say, the year 2013 in our case, rather than as the country’s choice to
adopt EDIS in response to those attributes over time.  We shall provide further empirical findings
below to address this timing or causation problem.
We first compare the economies with and without EDIS with respect to the above
explanatory variables.  As can be seen from Table 2, economies with EDIS have on the average a
higher deposits-GDP ratio and also a higher level of economic freedom but a lower five-firm
concentration ratio and a lower level of government ownership of banks.  As expected, a larger
proportion of economies with EDIS has experienced systemic banking crises – almost 4/5 when
compared with only 1/3 in those economies without EDIS.  More formally, the test results of equality
of means based on the Satterthwaite-Welch t-statistics clearly indicate that the means of all these
variables, except government bank ownership, are statistically different between these two groups
of economies.   In sum, these facts or statistical findings are consistent with the predictions of our25
theory.
Next we check the design features of EDIS that are relevant to our theory.  Apparently our
theory predicts that EDIS should be publicly administered or at least jointly administered by the
public and private sectors, or else there would be no role for the politicians or bureaucrats to play. 
On the other hand, sources of funding for EDIS are expected to come from the private sector rather
than the government because, according to our theory, the politicians or bureaucrats derive utilities
from higher profits.  Our theory also suggests compulsory membership in EDIS and also non-risk
 The Satterthwaite-Welch t-statistics are used because the variances of these variables are not homogeneous25
between these two groups.  Nonetheless, the statistical inference and conclusion remain intact even if we assume equal
variances and apply the traditional t-statistics.
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rated deposit insurance premium in order to result in cross subsidization from good banks to bad
banks.26
These features of 111 EDIS as of 2013 are tabulated as Table 3.  As can be seen, membership
is compulsory across all EDIS.  Most schemes have non-risk rated deposit insurance premiums,
although there are more schemes with risk-rated premiums than before.  The majority of these
schemes are publicly administered, followed by joint administration.  By contrast, sources of funds
largely come from the private sector, and only two schemes are publicly funded.   Once again, all27
these features are consistent with the predictions of our theory.
As a formal empirical analysis, we proceed with an estimation of the determinants of EDIS
adoption based on a binary-choice dependent variable model.  Similar to but not exactly the same
as Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), our analysis examines a cross-sectional data for countries by
estimating respectively a logit model and a probit model (e.g. Greene 2008) , in which the28
dependent variable is the existence of an EDIS as of 2013.  In general the model is specified as:
(9)
i iwhere DI  =1 for economy i if it has already set up an EDIS by 2013 and DI  =0 otherwise; the vector
iX  is a vector of the explanatory and control variables as of 2011, and å is a random disturbance term. 
 Our predictions about these design features are based on our theory and the current EDIS arrangements in26
the world.  Historically, there had been private or state-sponsored, not national, EDIS.  There were also other institutional
arrangements, such as clearinghouses, to deal with bank runs.  For details, see Kroszner and  Melick (2008), Calomiris
and White (1994), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987), to name just a few.
 Details of these characteristics of EDIS by individual country and by income group can be found in Demirgüç-27
Kunt et al. (2014, 2015).
 The random disturbance term in a logit model follows a logistic distribution.  To allow for other possible28
distributions, we have also estimated a probit model (normal distribution) and a gompit model (skewed, extreme value 
distribution). For brevity, only the logit and probit regression results are reported because their results are qualitatively
similar.  We shall compare our approach and results with those of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) in the subsequent
discussion.
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According to our theory, the explanatory or proxy variables include the deposits-GDP ratio, the five-
firm concentration ratio, government ownership of banks, the extent of economic freedom (or the
level of political participation or democracy, whichever appropriate), compulsory membership in
EDIS, non-risk rated deposit insurance premium, the nature of the administration of EDIS, and
source of funding of EDIS.  Data on the first four variables are obtained or computed from the above
databases.  The last four explanatory variables are dummy variables.  The dummy variable
Membership in EDIS equals to one if it is compulsory and zero otherwise.  The Deposit Insurance
Premium dummy variable equals to one if it is non-risk rated and zero if it is risk rated.  The
indicator variable Administration equals one if an EDIS is publicly administered, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, the dummy variable Funding equals one if the EDIS funding comes from only private
sources, and zero otherwise.  For the control variables, we experiment with some potential
determinants of EDIS adoption not explained by our theory.  They include experience of systemic
banking crisis, external political pressure from the European Union, World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund.  In the case of European Union, we include a dummy variable EU Accession --
which equals one if a European country became an EU member or in an EU accession process
subsequent to the 1995 Fourth Enlargement, and zero otherwise, to reflect the EU's Directive of 1994
which encourages member countries to adopt EDIS.  In the case of World Bank and the IMF, a
dummy variable called IMF Influence is included -- which equals one if an economy established an
EDIS after 1999 and zero otherwise -- to reflect the fact that in 1999 the IMF endorsed deposit
insurance as good banking practice (Garcia 1999).  This dummy variable aims to capture the
influence from the IMF as well as emulation by economies which believed EDIS to be a universal
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best practice.   Due to limited data availability and our relative small sample size, we try to keep the29
specification parsimonious and exclude other control variables like systemic risk of the banking
system or other macroeconomic variables as in Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008).
The actual estimation procedures ran into a separation problem with the following
explanatory variables – Membership, Administration, Funding, Deposit Insurance Premium, EU
Accession and IMF Influence — irrespective of whether a logit or probit model is employed. 
Theoretically, this separation problem occurs when a regressor contains a separating value for which
all of the observations with values above this threshold value are associated with a single binary
response, whereas all values below are associated with the alternative response.  Consider
membership as an example.  If the Membership dummy variable takes a value of zero, the dependent
variable also takes a value of zero, whereas if the former equals to one, then the latter also equals to
one.  Intuitively, this means whenever an EDIS is adopted, its membership is compulsory.  As a
result, the maximum likelihood estimation method breaks down. Put differently, the regressor is a
"perfect predictor" of the dependent variable.  One possible solution to this problem is to obtain a
larger sample.  Another highly popular "solution" is simply to remove these offending regressors
from the specification.
We choose the second "solution" partly because of data unavailability and partly because
even a larger sample may not necessarily overcome this separation problem if these regressors are
really perfect predictor of EDIS adoption in the sense that they are either predetermined or
 We have also experimented with a dummy variable called World Bank Loans -- which is equal to one if a29
country had an adjustment lending program with World Bank for reforms to establish EDIS, and zero otherwise.  Similar
to IMF Influence, it is also a perfect predictor in the econometric estimation. However, the IMF Influence is preferred
because it covers more economies and also captures not only World Bank loans or IMF restructure programs but also
emulation.
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simultaneously determined when an EDIS is decided to be adopted.  Take EU Accession as an
example.  As a policy to integrate national financial markets in the European Union, the EU
Directive on Deposit Insurance that came into effect in 1994 dictates that its member countries and
candidate countries have to offer deposit insurance coverages.  Therefore, EU membership or
candidacy will imply the existence of EDIS; consequently in this case a larger sample does not solve
the separation problem.  This is similarly the case for membership in EDIS, the administration and
source of EDIS funding.  Even though these regressors are omitted from our specified models, they
certainly play a crucial role in determining EDIS adoption.  More importantly, the responses of the
dependent variable (i.e., EDIS adoption or not) to the regressors — membership in EDIS, the
administration and source of funding of EDIS – are all consistent with the predictions of our theory.
After omitting these offending regressors, the logit and probit estimation results are reported
in Table 4.  We also report the regression results for a linear probability model (LPM) for reference
and comparison.  The first column of Table 4 reports the logit estimation results.  The deposits-GDP
ratio has the correct positive sign as predicted but is only marginally significant, whereas the five-
firm concentration ratio has the correct negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10-percent
level.  Government ownership of banks has the correct negative sign but is not statistically
significant at the conventional levels.  The same holds for the Economic Freedom Index.   One30
plausible explanation is that the political process is so complex that it is unlikely to be captured or
reflected by a linear numerical index.  As expected, the control variable – experience of banking
 If the political rights or civil liberties index is used as a proxy instead, they also give the correct positive sign. 30
The civil liberties index is statistically insignificant, but the political rights index is marginally significant  with a p-value
of about 0.13.  However, if democracy, level of political participation or electoral regime is used as a proxy, they all give
the wrong sign though they are statistically insignificant.
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crisis – has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that countries
with systemic banking crises before are more likely to set up EDIS.  Besides the parameter estimates,
the McFadden R  for the logit regression is about 0.2, which is quite acceptable for a cross-sectional2
regression.  This together with the results of the likelihood ratio test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness-of-fit test suggests that this logit model, though parsimonious in terms of the number of
explanatory variables, captures some of the major determinants in EDIS adoption.
The probit estimation results are reported in the second column of Table 4.  They are
qualitatively similar to those of the logit model, although the coefficient estimates are quantitatively
different and also that both the deposits-GDP ratio and the concentration ratio have improved in
terms of statistical significance.
Although dropping the "perfect predictors" from the regression model is a commonly adopted
empirical strategy to overcome the separation problem, this procedure has been criticized because
it leads to mis-specification error due to omission of relevant explanatory variables.  Against this
background, we also report in the penultimate column of Table 4 the regression results of the LPM
that includes the EU Accession and IMF Influence as explanatory variables. It serves as a quick
check to examine if they are determinants of EDIS adoption.   As can be seen, the parameter31
estimates are similar to those of the logit and probit regressions as far as the predicted signs and
statistical significance are concerned.  More importantly, the results reveal that both EU Accession
and IMF Influence are significant determinants of EDIS adoption.
The coefficients of the LPM are known to be inefficient because of heteroscedasticity.  In
 Arguably, the LPM is not necessarily outperformed by binary-response models because of its advantages such31
as being easier to use and to interpret than the latter models.  For defense of the LPM, see for example Angrist and
Pischke (2009).
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addition to the t-statistics computed from the Newey-West heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors reported for hypothesis testing and inference, Goldberger’s weighted least squares (WLS)
model is also applied to correct for heteroscedasticity.   As can be seen from the results reported in32
the last column of Table 4, there are noticeable improvements over the original LPM.  In particular,
government ownership of banks and economic freedom both become statistically significant, thus
strengthening the support to our theory.33
Though intuitively appealing, these LPM results are suggestive rather than definitive because
of the limitations of the LPM, such as the predicted probabilities can lie outside the 0-1 range and
the model fails to capture the nonlinear nature of the true population regression function.  Therefore,
we proceed further with the binary-choice dependent variable models with a different empirical
strategy to overcome these limitations and the aforementioned separation problem.  For brevity, we
again focus on the logit model only.  First we repeat the logit regression by excluding the countries
which obtained EU accession after 1995 from the sample.  Ideally, the regression results should thus
be free from mis-specification error (assuming EU accession is the only omitted variable).  Put
differently, there is a tradeoff: the degree of freedom becomes lower because of a smaller sample,
but hopefully we may obtain unbiased estimates due to a correct specification.  The regression results
are reported in the first column of Table 5.  As can be seen, the results are qualitatively the same as
the logit regression results reported in Table 4 in terms of the predicted signs but they are somewhat
 The two-step procedure involves: (i) obtain the predicted values for the endogenous variable, say ì , based32
on the LPM and construct the estimated weights as ì(1!ì); and (ii) transform the data by the estimated weights and re-
run the LPM.  See Goldberger (1964) for details.
 Perhaps it should be further pointed out that the Goldberger procedure appears to be an appropriate correction33
method as the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistic of 1.29, not reported in the Table, indicates that the hypothesis of
homoscedasticity is not rejected.
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different in terms of the magnitudes of the parameter estimates and statistical significance.
By the same token, we repeat the logit regression by excluding the countries or economies
which set up EDIS after 1999 from our sample.  Once again, ideally the regression results should be
free from misspecification error if IMF Influence is the only omitted variable.  The regression results
are reported in the second column of Table 5.  In this case, the results are considerably different from
the previous two sets of results.  Particularly, the magnitudes of the parameter estimates have
changed noticeably and their statistical significance has also improved.  The significantly higher
MaFadden R  also indicates that this model has a stronger explanatory power in terms of goodness-2
of-fit than the previous two models.
Similarly, we repeat the logit regression by excluding the countries which obtained EU
accession after 1995 and also those economies which set up EDIS after 1999 from the sample. 
Ideally, in this sample, those economies' decisions to adopt EDIS should not have been subject to
the external political pressure arising from the EU or the IMF (assuming other omitted explanatory
variables are random in such a way that they are all captured by the random disturbance term). 
Therefore, the logit regression results are theoretically not subject to mis-specification error and
hence it is a more appropriate test of our theory.  The regression results are reported in the third
column of Table 5.  They are highly similar to those reported in the second column. While both sets
of results produce some satisfactory findings like correct signs, statistical significant estimates, high
MaFadden R , etc., they suffer a couple of defects -- namely, the Economic Freedom Index has the2
wrong sign, though statistically insignificant, and also the model fails to pass the Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness-of-fit test marginally at the 10% level.
The findings for the Economic Freedom Index (and also the other proxies) can possibly be
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due to a couple of reasons.  First, they can simply arise as a sample property -- a strong positive
correlation of 0.48 between the deposits-GDP ratio and the Economic Freedom Index (as well as
other proxies).  The strong correlation is not surprising as most advanced economies are democratic
on the one hand and also have high volume of deposits relative to GDP on the other. This high
collinearity probably causes the estimate for the Economic Freedom Index to be statistically
insignificant and also to change from the right sign to the wrong sign when the sample size becomes
smaller.   Second, as already mentioned, the political-economy process is so complex that it is34
unlikely to be captured by a scalar index with a simple linear relationship.
Further tests indicate that the Economic Freedom Index can be regarded as a redundant
variable whereas the deposits-GDP ratio can not.  We therefore drop the Economic Freedom Index
from the specification and the results are reported in the last column of Table 5.  As can be seen, the
estimates for all the explanatory variables have the correct signs as expected and they are all
statistically significant except government ownership of banks.  These findings together with the
MaFadden R , the likelihood ratio test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test reveal that2
the model offers a satisfactory explanation for EDIS adoption by economies which were not under
the external political pressure from EU accession or IMF influence.
Based on this last set of logit results, we compute and report in Table 6 the odds ratios and
the marginal effects at the means (MEMs) due to a change in one of the explanatory variables,
 The deposits-GDP ratio or the Economic Freedom Index (or the other proxies) has the right sign and is34
statistically significant if either one is included individually in the regression.  However, the Economic Freedom Index
(or the other proxies) becomes statistically insignificant if both variables are included.  As can be seen, in larger samples
the Economic Freedom Index (and the other proxies) has the correct sign as predicted, but it changes to the wrong sign
in smaller samples.
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assuming all other things equal and also no banking crisis initially.   To illustrate, for all the 5535
countries in our sample, an increase in the deposits-GDP ratio numerically by 0.1 (or 10 percentage
points if deposits are expressed as a percentage of GDP), all other things equal, leads to an odds ratio
of 1.59 (i.e., the ratio of the new odds of 1.96 after the change to the initial odds of 1.23), implying
an increase in the probability of EDIS adoption from the initial 0.55 to 0.66 following the change
in the deposits-GDP ratio or, in other words, an MEM of 0.11.  Table 6 also reports the MEMs for
developed countries and LDCs, respectively at 0.044 and 0.107, suggesting that, at the margin, the
impact of the increase in deposits-GDP ratio on EDIS adoption is stronger among the LDCs.  These
findings are plausible as almost all advanced economies already have high deposits-GDP ratios and
EDIS at the same time.
Similarly, the odds ratios suggest that if the concentration ratio (or government ownership
of banks) increases by 0.1, then the probability of EDIS adoption will drop by a considerable 0.18
(or a meager 0.01) according to the MEMs.  The intuition is straightforward and has already been
mentioned by our theory: when the banking industry is more concentrated or monopolized, whether
in the hand of the private sector or the government, there is little incentive for EDIS adoption.  The
MEMs for the developed countries and LDCs suggest that the impacts are not significantly different
between the two groups.
In contrast, the impact of banking crises is more prominent and plausible in practice. The
odds ratio suggests that the probability of EDIS adoption would increase significantly by an MEM
 Unlike in the case of a LPM where the marginal effect of an increase in an explanatory variable is its35
regression coefficient, i.e. a constant, the marginal effect in the case a logit model is not a constant.  Following the
convention, we compute the marginal effects by valuing the explanatory variables (except banking crisis) at their sample
means.
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of 0.38 to 0.93 after an occurrence of a systemic banking crisis.  In reality most economies set up
EDIS after experiencing systemic banking crises; and the MEM of 0.52 suggests that LDCs are more
inclined to do so than the developed countries.
The above findings and interpretations are illustrative rather than definitive.  After all, the
marginal effect of a change in an explanatory variable in a logit or probit model is not a constant but
a function of the explanatory variables.  Furthermore, as already mentioned earlier, these findings
may not represent the actual response or timing in EDIS adoption due to our cross-sectional
specification.
Although it is infeasible to estimate a hazard model of EDIS adoption based on the available
data, we address the adoption timing or causation problem by carrying out an alternative statistical
analysis based on the available data plus data on government ownership of banks in 1995 provided
by La Porta et al. (2002).  More specifically, we have data on EDIS and the explanatory variables
for 1995.  Then we classify these countries into three groups: (I) those already had EDIS by 1995,
(II) those did not have EDIS in 1995 but set up one in subsequent years, and (III) those still had not
yet set up EDIS by 2013, and compare them statistically, in particular the last two groups – i.e., those
economies did not have EDIS in 1995.  The summary statistics and comparisons are tabulated as
Table 7.  As can be seen, economies in Group II had, on the average, a higher deposits-GDP ratio,
a lower concentration ratio, a lower government ownership of banks and higher economic freedom
in 1995 than those economies in Group III.  All these characteristics are consistent with the
predictions of our theory; and more importantly, they also shed some light on the timing and
causation problem – how these economies’ attributes as observed in 1995 affected their decisions
to adopt EDIS in subsequent years.
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Like Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), this study contributes to the literature by providing
empirical findings to explain why economies adopt EDIS. Admittedly, our study is technically
simple and parsimonious in terms of model specification and it focuses on only a few explanatory
variables relevant to our theory.  By contrast, theirs is econometrically more sophisticated and,
thanks to a larger panel dataset, is able to incorporate more variables to explore and analyze what
the determinants of EDIS adoption are but without reference to any specific economic theory. 
Despite the differences in model specifications, econometric techniques, data used, etc., both studies
find that banking crisis, external political pressure from the IMF and EU are common factors
affecting EDIS adoption.  On the other hand, there are some differences in the empirical findings:
the deposits-GDP ratio is found to be a significant factor in this study but statistically insignificant
in theirs; government ownership of banks carries a negative sign according to our findings but carries
an opposite sign in theirs, though statistically insignificant in both cases; and finally we have found
the concentration ratio carries a negative sign and is statistically significant, whereas it is not
considered at all by them.
In practice, EDIS can be adopted for one reason or another, or a combination of various
factors with different weights – some countries adopted EDIS because of banking instability, others
yielded to external political pressure, and so on.  Simply put, our model is admittedly not one-size-
fits-all.  Nevertheless, the above econometric results on the average lend support to our bureaucratic-
entrepreneurial theory.  Given the limitations in the econometric analysis, the next section offers a
case study of Canada as a further piece of evidence to support our theory.
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6. A Case Study of Canada
Canada is one of the advanced democratic economies in the world.  Its deposits-GDP ratio
stood at 40.2 or the 20  highest in the world in 1967, the year when CDIC was established.  The twoth
most significant types of financial intermediaries in the deposit market were the larger, safer
chartered banks and the relatively smaller and riskier TMLs.  The Government did not have any
ownership of these depository institutions.  This political and economic background is consistent
with the conditions discussed earlier according to our theory.  Needless to say, the external political
pressure from the IMF or EU can entirely be ruled out as a determinant for Canada to adopt EDIS
at that time.  Nor was systemic banking instability a major factor or threat.  The last bank failure took
place more than 40 years ago in 1923 when the Home Bank of Canada failed because of a large-scale
fraud by its senior management.  The stability of the Canadian banking system has long been well
recognized: despite the system-wide US bank failures during the Great Depression, the Canadian
banking system was immune from any contagion effect and none of its banks failed (see e.g.
Friedman and Schwartz 1963).  After ruling out these determinants of EDIS adoption, the Canadian
case provides virtually a natural laboratory for testing the empirical validity of our theory.
Almost all studies of deposit insurance in Canada maintain that the establishment of CDIC
in 1967 was based on the public-interest reasons, such as preventing bank runs and promoting
competition.  One exception is Carr et al. (1994), who postulate that the establishment of CDIC was
politically motivated.  Their political hypothesis and our theory are not mutually exclusive.  In fact,
both studies are based on the private-interest theory and hence there are certain commonalities. 
More specifically, Carr et al. argue and show empirically that CDIC was introduced to support TMLs
by forcing chartered banks to subsidize them through an EDIS which required all chartered banks
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and TMLs to be members and to pay the same non-risk-rated premiums (see Carr et al. 1994, pp. 43-
66 for details).  In essence, their main theme is the same as some of our aforementioned hypotheses.
The two theories are indeed complementary to each other in offering a more complete
political economy explanation for EDIS adoption in Canada.  Both theories predict that the
establishment of CDIC favored the TMLs.  Available historical statistics (Section J, Leacy 1983)
indicate that chartered banks’ holding of deposits from the general public stood at $31.5 billion or
about 3.2 times the deposits held by TMLs in 1971, whereas the figures were respectively $13.8
billion and 4.3 times in 1963.  This casual empiricism reflects a shift of market shares from chartered
banks to TMLs after CDIC was set up.  Admittedly, this shift of market shares started before 1967
because TMLs expanded their operations as a result of a growing economy, residential construction
and real estate development during the 1960s.  But had it not been for the establishment of CDIC in
1967, TMLs might not be able to maintain their strong momentum of growth over this period
following the financial difficulty of British Mortgage Trust Corporation in 1965 and the run on York
Trust and Savings Corporation in 1966.  The average annual growth in chartered bank deposits was
about 11% both before and after the establishment of CDIC.  By contrast, the average annual growth
in TML deposits was about 17% before 1967 and remained robust – at about 14% – in subsequent
years, thanks to CDIC.  Carr et al. recognize that the regulatory authority “may serve to provide
private benefits for favored groups of institutions and improve the career prospect of financial sector
regulation” (1994, p. 95).  However, their empirical analysis focuses on testing the two competing
hypotheses of EDIS adoption – namely the political hypothesis versus the economic efficiency
hypothesis.  To test our theory, we focus here on the regulators’ gains from the establishment of
CDIC.
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 Table 8 shows some selected statistics for CDIC in its first 25 years of operation.
Apparently, both CDIC’s number of employees and annual budget increased dramatically over the
years.  When CDIC was initially set up, the Federal Government subscribed $10 million of capital,
higher than the $6 million deposit insurance fund raised from member institutions, which paid an
annual premium of 1/30 of 1% of insurable deposits.  But the latter easily became the main source
of CDIC’s funds in subsequent years as insurable deposits grew over time and the premium was
raised to 1/10 of 1% of insurable deposits in 1991.  This is consistent with our theory in that EDIS
is mainly privately rather than publicly funded.  With this funding source, CDIC’s annual budget
grew dramatically by more than 70 times from a meager $0.4 million in 1967 to $29 million in 1992,
whereas its staff increased from one employee only to 94 employees over the same period.  It can
be argued that the expansion was due to such factors like increases in member institutions and
inflation.  But over these 25 years, the number of member institutions roughly doubled and the
inflation rate (measured by changes in the consumer price index) was 364% or about 6% p.a. 
Apparently, the growth in CDIC’s staff and annual budget was considerably more than the need to
accommodate the growth in the deposit-taking industry and inflation.  This phenomenon reflects
government bureaucrats’ gains in power, opportunities for promotion and perquisites, etc., from the
growth of the bureaucracy and its budget (Niskanen 1971).
In sum, our theory is also empirically supported by the above analysis and findings with
reference to Canada’s case of EDIS adoption.
7. Conclusion
This study follows the private-interest view of regulation and the models a la Peltzman
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(1976), Becker (1983) and Kane (1989) to develop a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial theory to explain
EDIS adoption.  In our theory, the regulator, i.e., the provider or administrator of EDIS, plays a dual
role as both a bureaucrat (e.g. Niskanen 1971) and an entrepreneur to maximize his own self-interest
by building an enterprise – an EDIS in this case.
Comparing our theory with other private-interest theories in the literature, there are probably
more similarities than differences because our theory is essentially an extension.  Those theories are
more general in nature and can be applicable to various industries, whereas our theory focuses on
EDIS adoption, although theoretically our economic ideas and analytical framework can be applied
to other areas as well — for instance, our theory can potentially be applied to analyze why the
European Union has established an ever increasing number of administrative agencies which enjoy
independent legal status and have separate budgets since the 1990s.  Nevertheless, our theory differs
in some aspects and contributes to the literature in that it integrates bureaucratic behavior and private
interest together to give the regulator a dual role to play both as a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur (or
enterprise builder).  As in those private-interest theories, in our theory interest groups have a role to
play in the regulatory process, but the regulator plays a more explicit and active role to maximize
his own utility.  Put differently, the regulator is not simply an agent or a puppet of the interest groups,
and he cares about his own interests more than the interest groups'.  Thus, a prominent difference
between our theory and the capture theory is that the regulator in our theory does not necessarily
have to be captured by the regulated.
Besides the theoretical contribution, this study contributes to the empirical literature on EDIS
adoption.  Several empirically testable hypotheses, or conditions under which EDIS adoption is more
likely follow or can be inferred from our theory.  To some extent, they are supported by the statistics,
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stylized facts, as well as the formal regression results of binary-choice models based on cross-country
data for 86 economies in 2013.  To recapitulate, our empirical findings indicate that: most EDIS are
(i) publicly administered and (ii) privately funded; (iii) all EDIS have compulsory membership; (iv)
most EDIS have non-risk rated insurance premiums, particularly when they were initially set up; on
the other hand, economies with EDIS have on the average (v) larger deposit markets, (vi) lower
concentration ratios in their banking industries, (vii) lower government ownership of banks, and
(viii) higher levels of economic freedom.  In addition to the formal statistical and regression
analyses, we examine Canada’s experience in introducing deposit insurance in 1967 as a case study. 
Overall, all the empirical findings lend support to our theory.
Our empirical findings also indicate clearly that experience of systemic banking crisis is a
significant determinant of EDIS adoption.  The regression results suggest that external political
pressure from EU accession, the IMF and the World Bank, emulation of other countries, and so on,
are also important factors, as found earlier by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008).  Admittedly, these determinants have certainly been taken into
consideration by regulators of some economies in their decisions to adopt EDIS.  However, it should
be stressed that these factors and our theory are not mutually exclusive.  Following a banking crisis,
for example, a regulator may take the opportunity to decide to set up an EDIS so as to convince the
general public that he has taken steps to implement a policy to maintain banking stability on the one
hand, and to maximize his own self-interest on the other.  In this case, the two motives are not
mutually exclusive.  How to disentangle them will be left for future research.
Deposit insurance is part of the financial safety net. Kane (2009) has offered two reasons why
safety nets expand over time: (i) large financial institutions whose operations lie formally outside
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the safety net have strong incentives to make themselves too difficult for regulators to let them fail
and unwind in crisis circumstances, and (ii) safety-net managers under-invest in crisis planning
during good times and consequently crisis-generated changes in the ordering of regulatory norms
dispose regulators to rescue financial institutions that are difficult to fail and unwind without holding
themselves closely accountable for either the costs or the distributional effects of the subsidies the
rescue engenders.  Though simply, our theory can also be applied to explain why safety nets, such
as EDIS, expand over time because of deposit insurance providers’ bureaucratic-entrepreneurial
behavior, as evidenced by the growth of CDIC’s annual budget over the years under study.
Before we come to a close, perhaps it should be emphasized that this study is purely a
positive analysis, although the term bureaucracy often carries a derogatory connotation in our daily
use.  It is one thing that EDIS are set up because of regulators’ bureaucratic behavior.  But it is a
different thing whether EDIS can be effectively administered to maintain banking stability.  All in
all, this paper not only offers an economic theory to explain EDIS adoption but also potentially sheds
new light on other areas of financial regulation.
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Figure 1: Indifference Curve Analysis of the Regulator’s Choice
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables
Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum No. of
Obs.
Deposits/GDP (%)  59.6256  50.1524  9.5914  339.6859 106
Concentration
Ratio (%)
 78.4731  19.5907  10.6121 100 91
Government Ownership
of Banks (%)
 15.1819  18.0341 0 73.7 119
Economic Freedom  6.9856  0.7602 3.96 8.91 101
Note:
The numbers of observations are not the same across the board because of data availability. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Economies With and Without EDIS
Without EDIS With EDIS Total Equality
Test
Number of Economies 78 112 190 n.a.
Deposits/GDP 44.0% 66.0% 59.6% -2.87***
(31) (75) (106)




17.2% 14.6% 15.3% 0.65
(34) (83) (117)
Economic Freedom 6.6 7.1 6.98 -2.74***
(26) (75) (100)
Banking Crisis 11 49 60 -2.87***
(33) (79) (112)
Notes:
1. For deposits/GDP, concentration ratio, government ownership of banks and economic freedom,
the reported figures are their average values.
2. Figures in parentheses are the numbers of observations included in the calculations.
3. The total number of observations in each category does not equal to 190 because data for some
economies are unavailable.
4. For the test of equality of means reported in the last column, the figures are the Satterthwaite-
Welch t-statistics; although the results and inference are qualitatively intact using the traditional t-
statistics.  These are two-tail tests and the conclusions remain unchanged and reinforced if one-tail
tests are used instead.
5. *** denotes statistical significance at the one-percent level.
6. A full list of economies with or without EDIS can be found in Table 1 of Demirgüç-Kunt et al.
(2014). 
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Table 3: Design Features of EDIS
Administration Public Joint Private
73 25 13
(65.8) (22.5) (11.7)






Insurance Premium Non-Risk Rated Risk Rated
77 34
(69.4) (30.6)
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the percentages of the total number (111) of EDIS.
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Models of EDIS Adoption
Model Logit Probit LPM WLS
Intercept 1.8908 1.1103 0.6561 0.6571
(0.46) (0.54) (1.40)^ (2.57)**
[0.44] [0.53] [1.22]
Deposits/GDP 2.2471 1.1972 0.1009 0.06
(1.50)^ (1.71)* (1.19) (1.87)*
[1.44]^ [1.65]* [2.07]**
Concentration Ratio -4.7233 -2.6671 -0.5869 -0.5386
(-1.90)* (-2.26)** (-2.91)*** (-4.18)***
[-1.82]* [-2.19]** [-3.71]***
Government Ownership of banks -1.5978 -0.8875 -0.289 -0.1955
(-0.78) (-0.86) (-1.20) (-2.20)**
[-0.75] [-0.84] [-1.09]
Economic Freedom 0.2284 0.1343 0.0535 0.0597
(0.43) (0.51) (0.88) (1.90)*
[0.42] [0.50] [0.77]
Banking Crisis 1.5762 0.8446 0.1726 0.1211
(2.42)** (2.23)** (1.95)** (2.66)***
[2.32]** [2.16]** [1.95]**
EU Accession 0.1607 0.1518
(1.29)^ (4.60)***
[2.80]***
IMF Influence 0.2815 0.2582
(3.35)*** (5.45)***
[4.87]***
McFadden R  or adj. R 0.1957 0.192 0.2194 0.26972 2
S.E.E. 0.3642 0.3661 0.3539 0.5815
Like. Ratio test or F test 16.74*** 16.42*** 4.41*** 5.48***
Hosmer-Lemeshow test 10.39 10.85
No. Of Observations 86 86 86 86
Notes:
1. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics for the binary-choice dependent variable models and are t-statistics for the
linear probability model, whereas figures in brackets are respectively the z-statistics computed from the GLM robust
standard errors and the t-statistics computed from the Newey-West heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
2. ***, **, *, and ^ denote respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels.
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set up after 1999
Intercept 2.5496 3.9935 5.0189 3.1096
(0.73) (0.96) (1.17) (1.39)^
[0.71] [0.75] [0.98] [1.20]
Deposits/GDP 1.9508 5.0607 5.0997 4.6553
(1.49)^ (2.23)** (2.25)** (2.36)**
[1.45]^ [1.75]* [1.87]* [2.03]**
Concentration Ratio -4.9232 -7.0531 -7.3556 -7.3419
(-2.30)** (-2.62)*** (-2.65)*** (-2.67)***
[-2.25]** [-2.05]** [-2.21]** [-2.30]**
Government Ownership of banks -1.594 -1.9748 -1.4527 -0.4826
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.65) (-0.25)
[-0.86] [-0.68] [-0.54] [-0.21]
Economic Freedom 0.179 -0.1682 -0.291
(0.40) (-0.30) (-0.51)
[0.39] [-0.24] [-0.43]
Banking Crisis 1.3238 2.6841 2.3936 2.3864
(2.91)* (2.52)*** (2.25)** (2.27)**
[1.87]* [1.98]** [1.89]* [1.95]**
McFadden R 0.1848 0.3055 0.2998 0.29042
S.E.E. 0.3865 0.3659 0.3855 0.3844
Like. Ratio test 14.93** 21.85*** 20.17*** 19.75***
Hosmer-Lemeshow test 6 14.45* 13.27* 10.18
No. Of Observations 76 60 54 55
Notes:
1. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics whereas those in brackets are the z-statistics computed from the GLM robust
standard errors.
2. ***, **, *, and ^ denote respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels.
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Table 6: Effects of Change in the Explanatory Variables on EDIS Adoption
Marginal Effect at the Means
Odds Ratio All Countries Developed
Countries
LDCs
No. Of Obs. 55 20 35
Initial Odds 1.233 6.6659 0.4451
Deposits/GDP 1.5929 0.1108 0.0444 0.1068
Concentration
Ratio
0.4799 -0.1804 -0.1077 -0.132
Government
Ownership of Banks
0.9529 -0.012 -0.0056 -0.0102
Banking Crisis 10.87 0.3784 0.1168 0.5208
Notes:
1. Odds are defined as the ratio of the probability of EDIS adoption to the probability of no adoption.
2. The odds ratio is the odds after a change in an explanatory variable to the initial odds, assuming
all other things equal.  An odds ratio larger (smaller) than one implies an increase (a decrease) in the
probability of EDIS adoption after the change, and the larger (smaller) the ratio, the larger (smaller)
the increase (decrease).
3. The marginal effect is the change in the probability of EDIS adoption due to a change in an
explanatory variable with all explanatory variables valued at their sample means except banking
crisis, which is assumed to equal to zero (i.e. no banking crisis initially).
4. Since banking crisis is a dummy variable, the marginal effect measures the increase in the
probability of EDIS adoption as a result of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis.
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not have EDIS in













and III  
Deposits/GDP 47.9% 45.3% 32.6% -1.09^
(41) (27) (28)




39.0% 33.4% 54.4% 1.60*
(40) (20) (7)
Economic Freedom 6.6 6.3 5.8 -1.08^ 
(42) (23) (19)
Notes:
1. For deposits/GDP, concentration ratio, government ownership of banks and economic freedom,
the reported figures are the average values.
2. Figures in parentheses are the numbers of observations included in the calculations.
3. For the test of equality of means reported in the last column, the figures are the t-statistics based
on one-tail tests.
4. ***, **, *, and ^ denote respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels.
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1967 69 1* 0.4 0.0144* 400,000* 
1980 123 5 0.8 0.0407 160,000
1982 186 7 1 0.0376 142,857
1987 162 45 9 0.2778 200,000





1967-92 2.9 19.9* 18.7 16.5* -1.0*
1980-92 1.2 27.7 34.9 26.2 5.6
Source: CDIC Annual Report 1998-1999 and the author’s calculations.
Note: * These figures do not reflect the true picture and should be interpreted with care because,
according to CDIC, staff was also provided by the Department of Insurance and the Department of
Finance; however, the actual number is not disclosed by CDIC.  
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